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Abstract 
 
This paper tries to further elaborate one of the most important external powers of the European Union: Its 
“reforming power” which goes in parallel with its ability as “normative actor” in the Western Balkans. 
Through Albania as a case study, it tries to argue that the process of Albania’s integration to EU has 
transformed the country in several directions: by introducing a deep juridical reform and by the full 
alignment of its foreign policy with CFSP and the “regional cooperation”. In fact, under the auspices of the 
EU integration, the country is making all the efforts to deliver on one of the most transformative reforms 
undertaken in the region, that of the justice system. This gives to EU the features of a “reforming power”. 
The term shows EU as a driving force which makes countries undertake deep reforms they would not have 
differently realized, if not under the conditionality for the EU integration.  
 
Keywords: Albania; EU integration; enlargement; reforming power; transformative power; regional 
cooperation; conditionality 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now more than a decade since the European Union has been called a 
“normative power” (Manners 2002) a “civilian power” (Bull 1982) a “soft power” (Nye 
1990) and recently also a “regime maker” (O’Brennan, Gassie 2009) a “transformative 
power” (Grabbe, 2006) or a “member state builder” (Keil, Arkan 2016, 4); all terms used 
in the context of the “Europeanization” and the “democratization” of potential member 
states. In every case, the common denominator of these terms has to do with the fact 
that the European Union represents a substantial, peaceful power vs. a material, military 
one and there is where its strength lies. 
This terminology has had a significant impact on the countries of the Western 
Balkans (WB), a region which more than ever needs a common European perspective 
during these hard times of rising of nationalism, populism and influences of third actors. 
Even though this might seem true in a first glance, there are many scholars who have 
often criticized the limited impact of the EU in the Western Balkans by stating, for 
instance, that the EU: “has limited potential when encountering defective democracies 
with little chance of becoming EU members (Dimitrova, Pridham 2004) or “lacks a strong 
normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with the EU's demands in 
areas related to state sovereignty” (Noutcheva 2007), or “lacks a plan B in order to 
prevent countries to be stucked in their way to EU as in the case of FYR of Macedonia, 
BiH and Kosovo” (Keil, Arkan 2016, 8). Other scholars suggest that the rule-of-law 
standards in EU accession countries cannot not be met only through “a credible EU 
accession perspective and an adequate degree of state capacity” (Elbasani 2009), or that 
the European Union's external democracy promotion via political conditionality might 
be ineffective in “countries characterized by legacies of ethnic conflict” (Freyburg, 
Richter 2010). Another interesting point of view comes from Florian Bieber who argues 
that “conditionality approach has been largely ineffective in regard to state building in 
part due to the lack of commitment of political elites to EU integration and the 
persistence of status issue on the policy agenda” (Bieber 2011). 
In order to reach its main goal, this paper will try to explore, as well, how the 
conditionality principle towards the Western Balkans has been shaped in the last years 
according to the needs of the Enlargement policy of the EU to adapt to its internal and 
international crisis. It will try to further explore how this transformation has lately 
affected the WB Region. The Albanian case will be used as a successful example of the 
EU’s “reforming power” and its ability to make substantial changes within the Region of 
the Western Balkans.   
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THE SHAPING OF THE EU ENLARGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 
Enlargement has been one of the EU's most crucial questions in terms of its 
Foreign Policy approach yet has equally suffered from considerable opposition from the 
start. The phenomenon of the “enlargement fatigue” is not new, it goes back to the 
France’s two vetoes of British accession in the sixties, only that, by that time it was called 
in another name: that of the “political calculations” (ESI 2016). At the end, both 
enlargement enthusiasm and enlargement fatigue are only “recurring position in the 
pendulum swings of the European opinion” (ESI 2016). 
The same situation of both enthusiasm and fatigue is reflected in the WB 
region, as well. From 2003 when the EU Summit in Thessaloniki  set integration of the 
Western Balkans as a priority until now, enlargement has had its ups and downs and the 
countries of the region are still struggling to fit in the bloc. After Slovenia in 2004, 
Croatia has been the other member state to join the club in 2013 and it seems to be the 
last one for a long time to come. The EU perspective dropped in its lowest levels in 2014 
when the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced a 
five-year halt on enlargement, a declaration which “echoed pessimism among the WB 
countries” (Balkan Policy Research Group 2018). This distancing of the membership 
prospects, coupled with the realization that achieving long-term stability and 
transforming the region could best be secured through economic growth and increased 
regional cooperation, produced a controversial trend, leading on the same year to the 
so-called Berlin process (European Parliament 2016), a German initiative launched by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel aiming to restore hope for EU integration to the region. 
Nevertheless, the role of this initiative has often been debated whether it was a 
substitute for the EU’s enlargement agenda or complementary to it. While the former 
role was clearly the spur in the wake of fading enthusiasm for further expansion, it was 
suggested that a reinvigorated enlargement effort from the EU part could make the 
Berlin process facilitate accession of the Western Balkans while enhancing the regional 
cooperation between them, but things did not seem to go always in the right direction. 
In fact, the last of its summits in London was expected to open a new chapter and to 
reiterate the countries’ engagement with the WB region, but what happened was that 
“EU member states ‘hijacked’ the Berlin Process for their own agenda, while adding little 
to the process” (Bieber 2018).  
As a consequence, a lot of criticism has embraced the Berlin process. There has 
been a lot of discussion about whether it was best to treat the Western Balkans 
collectively in this process, in order to avoid cherry-picking future EU members, or to try 
to generate peer competition to encourage those further behind the reform process to 
catch up with the leaders. Efforts to foster greater “regional cooperation” would argue 
for the collective approach. Meanwhile, the European Commission has adopted a more 
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rigorous approach to preparing the Western Balkans countries for membership in the 
EU. This approach is based on a benchmarking mechanism for assessing all chapters of 
the acquis (EU law), in particular those on the rule of law and good governance 
(Apelblat 2018). In parallel, through its main card of SAP (Stabilization Association 
Process) and the famous principle of “conditionality”, the EU has tried to ‘impose’, even 
though sometimes not publicly asked, some important policies or activities which have 
tried to shape the countries in the Western Balkans aiming to split them from the 
shadows of the past. To achieve this goal, the EC had introduced several changes to the 
Enlargement approach. In 2015, instead of an annual strategy, the Commission 
published a multiannual Enlargement Strategy to cover its five-year mandate. As part of 
its new Reporting Methodology, the Commission placed a stronger emphasis on the 
state of play and harmonized the assessment scales, making it easier to gauge a 
country's readiness for EU accession and compare it with other countries over time. The 
Reports were to include clearer recommendations for priority actions to be carried out 
within a year, making it easier to track their implementation, known as 'fundamentals 
first': Rule of law including Judicial Reform, tackling organized crime and corruption, 
fundamental rights including freedom of expression and fighting discrimination and the 
functioning of democratic elements including Public Administration, Economic 
development and strengthening of competitiveness (European Commission 2015). In 
2016, the time-frame for publishing the next enlargement package shifted from autumn 
2017 to spring 2018, to better align it with the release of the Economic Reform programs 
and the increased focus on Economic Governance (European Parliament 2017). 
The main novelty of this renovated EU approach is that it brought Rule of law 
to the fore by deciding for Chapters 23 and 24 in the negotiation process to be the first 
to open. Another high spot was insisting on the regional cooperation as an important 
factor which will give fresh impetus to the region's economic performance, reconcile its 
society and prepare it for eventual EU membership (European Parliament 2017). In this 
context, regional cooperation and good neighbor Relations were once again brought to 
the fore as an indispensable means of re-energizing common reform priorities and 
maximizing benefits for the region. The current year, 2018, has certainly seen a renewed 
focus on EU enlargement in the Balkans created by recent and ongoing events and 
initiatives such as the State of the Union speech and the first visit of President Juncker in 
the region, the  personal engagement of HRVP Mogherini in the Western Balkans, the 
February Strategy of the Commission, the April enlargement package, EU-WB Summit in 
Sofia, the latest Council decision on enlargement, the London Summit and the  
Bulgarian EU Presidency putting the European perspective of the Western Balkans as a 
key priority. The main responsibility still relies, nevertheless, on the WB’ domestic 
regimes: they might fail to fully accomplish with the Reforms, as Noutcheva had pointed 
out a decade ago (Noutcheva 2007).  
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ALBANIA’S JUDICIAL REFORM PAVES THE WAY TO THE COUNTRY’S 2018 MAIN 
OBJECTIVE: OPENING OF ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH EU 
 
Even though diplomatic relations of Albania with EU (European Economic 
Community at that time) were established in June 1991, it was the Thessaloniki Summit in 
June 2003 which officially confirmed the EU perspective for all the countries part of the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The visit of the former President of 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, in 31st January 2003 in Albania to open the 
negotiations for signing the SAP, will stay in the country’s public opinion memory for a 
long time. 
From the perspective of the WB countries, the integration process has, for a 
long time, appeared as a unilateral one, depending mainly on the single country aiming 
to become part of the EU. This tendency has shifted gradually to a regional one since 
with the launch of Berlin process in 2014, thus giving more importance to a regional 
mindset shaping the Foreign Policies of the WB states based on principles of 
reconciliation, good neighborly relations, political and economic cooperation within the 
region. The case of Albania is worth mentioning in this direction as a country of the 
region whose government assessed regional cooperation as one of guiding principles of 
the Foreign Policy within the Governance Program 2013-2017 (Beshku 2016), while has 
aligned the governing to the adaptation of its key priorities with the “regional 
cooperation” and the European Integration in its last Governance Program 2017-2021 
(Qeveria e Republikës së Shqipërisë  2017). 
From an EU perspective, the EU integration process of the WB, due to frequent 
internal instability and political crisis of the region since 1990, has often resembled “to 
the ‘raising of a difficult child’” where the “EU has taken the role of a ‘European nanny’” 
(Elbasani 2004). It is important, though, to explore the transformations of both sides in a 
twofold analysis: The country’s Reforms and the shaping of its Foreign Policy from one 
side and the EU Enlargement policies from the other. It is not the first time that Albania 
represents a good example in this direction: “Albania-EU relations constitute an 
excellent case study for analyzing from one side the strategies of transition states in 
developing their external relations and from the other side the development of the EU’s 
external relations of countries in its regional influence” (Ailish 2001). Meanwhile, the 
enlargement policy of the EU towards the Western Balkans has changed by becoming 
more and more demanding and sophisticated than the previous EU enlargement 
rounds, combining traditional aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and acquis 
communautaire to more specific new ones as those contained in different chapters of 
SAP, with “rule of law” and “regional cooperation” being the key denominators of the 
process. The political conditionality of the EU towards the WB countries has changed 
especially after the ‘troubles’ faced within the last enlargements and the recent 
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challenges that have affected the Union  such as: migration/refugees crisis, Brexit, 
foreign and security policy demands (Transatlantic relations, neo Great Power Politics), 
EU economy (consequence of Euro crises, shifting trade environment, crisis of social 
state) and the national political transformations (rise of populism, low participation in 
European elections) (World Economic Forum 2017). A set of precise norms related to 
state building, the proper functioning of public administration and that of the juridical 
system towards the Western Balkan countries was developed by introducing “a more 
muscular conditionality”, as Pridham had put it in a nutshell (Pridham 2007).  
The case of Albania pays tribute to these incentives. The country has 
transformed its foreign policy in line with the EU directives and alienates its domestic 
policy in this framework. In general, these transformations have usually had the support 
of the political elites and the society, since the Albanian society’s positive perception 
towards the European Union in Albania has been a lot supportive in the last decades. 
The “European affiliation” has never been put in doubt by its society and the ruling elites 
(AIIS 2014). No political party or movement, even outside of the traditional ones, has 
formally articulated any opposition towards the EU integration of Albania in its public 
speech, but it seems not to be enough still. A proactive approach from all internal 
parties is needed. The country is still waiting for the opening of the Accession 
Negotiations and finally a possible date has been set in June 2019, to prove itself 
“worthy” of this given possibility. 
The EU integration process has had its ups and downs, mostly related to 
internal domestic crisis and policies, but since 1990 when Albania came out of isolation 
and embraced the liberal democracy system, the European Integration has always been 
a national objective for the country and still continues to be one of the main axes of 
Albania’s foreign policy (Beshku 2016). It is still considered from all the parties, as the 
most efficient way of establishing a stable democracy, a competitive market and a 
modern society, by considering the EU as a “role model” and as a standard measuring 
mirror.  
In this direction, it is particularly true that the Albanian justice system was in 
need of a radical overhaul because the system suffered from widespread corruption, 
co-optation, professional shortages, and structural inefficiencies. Public trust in the 
courts and law enforcement was extremely low, and all of this represented an enormous 
challenge for rule of law and the Albanian political class seemed to agree on the need 
to urgently reform the justice sector, if not necessarily on how to go through it 
(Dobrushi 2017). Albania is not an exception of the cases. The key problems of the 
Western Balkans have been overall the same in the last decade: deep corruption, weak 
rule of law, doubtful justice system, fragmentizing parties and authoritarianism, resulting 
in a pattern of ‘democratic decline, both institutional and personal (BIEPAG 2017).  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 4, No. 2, 2018 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
 
 46 
The ways out to these problems remain different and personally tailored for 
each country, all arriving at the same point: reforms in order to reinforce the “rule of 
law” with a spillover effect on other fields such as “corruption” and “organized crime”. 
Albania, BiH, Kosovo, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia remain “weak states 
with dysfunctional institutions, notwithstanding the considerable diversity among them” 
(BIEPAG 2014). One thing is crucial in the Albanian case: having not been part of the ex-
Yugoslavia and its ethnic conflicts, Albania constitutes a country with a “potential of 
stability” in the whole region. This seems to have been totally comprised also from some 
EU countries, especially Germany and Austria, the main supporters of the Berlin Process. 
As Ryan Heath admits: “If anyone can become a surprise front-runner in the 
membership race it is Albania, already a NATO member, mostly free from the 
complications of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, with no bilateral disputes and a stability 
factor in the region” (Heath 2017). Furthermore, the fact that the country has undertaken 
a unique deep reform in the justice sector since 2016 with no predecessors in this 
direction, may fulfill the bases for the EU to be baptized with the term of a “reforming 
power”. 
Four years after being granted candidate status in 2014, the country has tried to 
demonstrate progress in the implementation of the five key priorities for the opening of 
accession negotiations, as confirmed by the last Reports of the European Commission. 
Referring to the 2015 Report on Albania, the country was “a constructive partner in the 
region, further developing solid bilateral relations with other countries preparing to join 
the EU and neighboring EU Member States” (European Commission 2015). Albania has 
continued to participate actively in the regional cooperation approach and continued to 
maintain good neighborly relations in line with its commitments under the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (European Commission 2015). Although the EU praised 
Albania's commitment and steady progress on them, it made it clear that the next step 
– opening negotiations – will depend primarily on completing the ongoing judicial 
reform and ensuring constructive cross-party political dialogue. “The judicial reform 
constitutes the toughest nut to crack. The rule of law is the cornerstone of the entire 
process” (Steinmeier 2014). Thus, the European Commission is supporting Albania in 
conducting a thorough and credible vetting process through the International 
Monitoring Operation (EEAS 2016). 
The thorough and complex justice reform was launched with a set of 
amendments that changed to one third of the country's Constitution. The main features 
of the ongoing reform can be summarized around the following pillars: measures to 
fight corruption, including by establishing a new Special Anti-Corruption and Organized 
Crime Structure (SPAK); measures to reduce the influence by the parliament and the 
executive on the judiciary; measures to increase the independence and effectiveness of 
the High Court, as well as the independence, impartiality and transparency of the 
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Constitutional Court and the High Council of Justice and Prosecution system; measures 
to increase accountability of judges and prosecutors, including by setting up the new 
High Judicial Council, the new High Prosecutorial Council, as well as a High Justice 
Inspector; measures to increase justice efficiency and access to justice (European 
Commission 2018).  
In addition to the institutional restructuring of the judiciary, the reform process 
foresaw the launch of a generalized re-evaluation (vetting) of all judges and 
prosecutors. This entails that around 800 professionals (judges) are currently 
undergoing scrutiny through the so called “the vetting process”. The vetting has already 
started. The Albanian vetting institutions have completed the assessment of the top 
priority cases (European Commission 2018). As a sui generis process, “the reform could 
be used as a role model by other countries in the region, not least because it considers 
stability concerns” (Bushati 2016). Nevertheless, the process has been stopped due to a 
political crises started on February 2017: the opposition party (Democratic Party) 
decided to boycott all parliamentary activities which started some months ahead the 
general parliamentary elections, supposed to be held on June 2017. There were the first 
signals that the reform was encountering a strong political resistance within the 
Albanian political environment.  
The crises seemed to finally come to an end in May 2017. The EU appraised the 
agreement reached by the two main political parties (Socialist party in power and 
Democratic party in opposition) by postponing the elections on 25 June 2017. After the 
elections, the Socialist Party (PS) took the power with an outright majority and the ability 
to form a single-party government. External factors such as the EU and the United 
States also exerted significant positive influence on Albania’s politics (Fras 2017). 
Although the vetting of the prosecutors still goes on, some of the main 
constituent bodies of the Justice System have not yet been put up, even after two years 
after the process has started. One thing, however, seems clear: “No matter how long it 
takes, or who is ultimately in control-all roads seem to lead in Brussels” (Dobrushi 2017). 
As it we tried to argue in the above analysis, the justice system’s reform of Albania does 
not constitute a point of arrival of the country’s advance towards the integration in the 
EU, but rather a point of departure, as a consequence of being the “rule of law” the 
cornerstone of the EU integration of the country. If duly and fully implemented, the 
successful ongoing of this Reform should lead to the opening of accession negotiations 
in 2019 of Albania with the European Union. 
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CONCLUSION: A “REFORMING POWER” EU 
 
After the decline of Soviet influence and the shortage of regime alternatives, 
the EU was the only hegemonic “civic” or “normative” power without competitors in the 
former communist space. However, the power of the European Union in the Balkans is 
linked to the credibility of the EU integration process (Abazi 2018). The integration 
process is strongly linked to the EU enlargement policies that present a fascinating 
policy field in which to explore the emergence of (new) modes of governance. 
Entrenched in the path-dependent evolution of EU external relations and enlargement, 
it exhibits all four modes of governance: hierarchy, negotiation, competition and 
cooperation. EU conditionality over membership in the club in combination with 
economic, legal, and financial linkages comes to be a mean for democratization, 
Europeanization and good governance in the region. Therefore, the integration and 
enlargement process should be in line with each other and with the development of the 
WB countries. EU’s patronizing role in guiding domestic political reform and economic 
transition, with the promise of future membership, is crucial for the future of the region.  
The way forward to the EU of the Western Balkans is based on the “conditionality” test 
of enlargement through reform driven approach from countries while relying on the 
golden carrot of membership. This is where EU bases its ‘supremacy’ as a necessary 
“reforming power” in the region. Under these conditions, it is true that the EU, often 
confronted with political pressures coming from national political forces in the WB 
countries in order to maintain the status quo, has become not only the “driving force” 
(Keil, Arkan 2016, 4) for their democratization, but also a crucial actor for important 
internal reforms. The question is: for how long will things uphold? 
The recent developments within and outside EU “have created a ‘power 
vacuum’ in the Western Balkans” (Abazi 2018), which third actors are attempting to use 
in their interests. In turn, Western Balkan leaders may be attempted to sometimes see 
the current geopolitical challenges “as an opportunity, not a problem” (Abazi 2018).  
However, in a changing international order, the EU must consider moving towards a 
deeper mode of integration and develop mechanisms to anticipate and alleviate any 
negative consequences of geopolitical developments. Keeping Western Balkan countries 
tied to a real EU involvement and perspective is a precondition for their not turning the 
back on Europe and meddling with third actors or authoritarian powers that do not 
uphold European values. Both sides need not fall for the prisoner’s dilemma, the 
notorious paradox in game theory in which two parties act out of individual self-interest 
and both lose out in the process (Abazi 2018). In this status of things, “formally opening 
the negotiations does not necessarily mean a swift or inevitable conclusion, but the EU 
needs to keep hopes alive among candidate nations if it wishes to retain its influence” 
(Kouchner 2017). 
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In the case of Albania, EU is highly perceived as the only way forward since the 
early nineties. The EU acts as a perfect “normative” or “soft power” able to generate 
consensus from all the political internal actors in the country, even though the reforms 
demanded by the EU are sometimes painful but necessary as the case of the still 
ongoing juridical reform in Albania has shown. In any case, the fact that the country has 
undertaken such a deep justice reform under the auspices of the EU may make the 
Albanian case as an “instructive” (Kouchner 2017) one and EU in its regard as an 
excellent “reforming power”. Thus, as we have tried to argue, Albania constitutes a good 
example of a reformateur under EU’s oversight comprising three areas: foreign policy 
(full alignment with CFSP), regional relations (good neighborly relations following Berlin 
Process series) and the domestic policy (reform of the justice system) as the rule of law 
is a crucial prerequisite for a healthy society, the consolidation of democracy and the 
economic development of a country on its way to the EU. 
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